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REVIEWS AND BOOK NOTICES.

Die Grundlagen der griechischen Syntax erörtert von B. DELBRÜCK. Halle a. S. 1879.

Delbrück has done so much for Indo-Germanic, so much for Greek syntax that a work by him on a theme so important as the bases of Greek syntax would have been reviewed in an earlier number of this journal had the book reached me in time for leisurely study before my long absence in Europe. Now that I have read the book I must confess to a certain measure of disappointment. It is professedly intended for such classical philologists as take an interest in linguistic studies without engaging personally in special investigations; and as nowadays there are few classical philologists who keep eyes and ears resolutely shut to the results of comparative grammar, the circle addressed is wide enough. But these classical philologists, if tolerably well acquainted with recent elementary grammars, will not be astounded by the novelty of the principles presented. Thanks to Delbrück himself in fair measure, the results of comparative grammar—certain results as they all are until questioned—have been incorporated into our school-books, and everybody knows the theory of the mixed cases in Greek and Latin. What is new in these hasty jottings, which certainly do not deserve so ambitious a title as *Grundlagen der griechischen Syntax*, is partly shadowy, partly hazardous. I do not think that the study will be as much advanced by this treatise as might have been expected. Certainly there is nothing in the 155 pages to justify the rather domineering manner in which the ‘ethnic’ grammarians of the Greek language are summoned to surrender their materials into the hands of ‘pro-ethnic’ masters. Delbrück in his earlier works has made some sad mistakes in his interpretation and analysis of phenomena, as he himself has acknowledged with honorable candor; and the old warning, *νάφει καὶ μένυσ' ἀπιστεῖν*, holds good for the student who takes the *Grundlagen* in hand.

I purpose in the following pages to give an outline of the first three chapters of the work, on gender, number and cases, with such comments as may suggest themselves. These chapters treat of problems which are to my mind among the most difficult in the range of Greek syntax; matters in which I am as sincerely desirous of enlightenment as the most ardent neophyte; and if I confess the disillusionments to which I have been subjected from time to time, I hope I shall be pardoned.

Delbrück begins with the irrefragable statement that as people talk in sentences, the Greeks brought sentences with them when they came to Greece, and the object of his research is to find out how far the forms of the ‘pro-ethnic’ sentence, the position of its parts, the construction of its verbs, may still be recognized. In this work he limits himself to the simple sentence.

The Greek being an inflected language, it becomes necessary to go back to the origin of inflexions and to deal with the fundamental conceptions of these

forms. The older method, which Delbrück considers as at least obsolescent, consists in setting up some general notion which, in the opinion of the investigator, would cover with its comprehensive expanse the various uses of the form under consideration, and the illustration which Delbrück gives of this mode is the definition of the subjunctive as the mood of 'possibility.' A more excellent way, it might seem, would be to ascertain what appeared to the Greek himself to be the essential use of a form, what was to him the common notion that lay at the basis of its varying applications. But Delbrück objects that in the first place it would be difficult to determine this; and then there is reason to doubt whether in forms of varying use such a general image ever existed in the consciousness of those who spoke the language. There were types of application, types, the existence of which is proved by the way in which language rebels against an attempt at a marked divergence, but there is no combination of these types into a general notion. There is therefore nothing to be done except to understand by fundamental conception the oldest signification. This oldest signification is of course 'pro-ethnic,' because all the inflexional forms of the Greek—except new analogical developments—go back to a period long antecedent to the Greek times. We can speak of the fundamental notion of the Indo-Germanic aorist, but only of the types of application of the Greek aorist, which is a continuation of the Indo-Germanic. Strictly speaking, then, the investigation into these fundamental conceptions does not enter into the plan of Delbrück's inquiry, which has to do, not with the origin of the kinds of words (or parts of speech) and of the forms, but with the change of the Indo-Germanic use into the Greek. Still it is evident that, even if it were only for the sake of the arrangement of the material, it would be necessary to trench upon this difficult ground; but our author promises great reserve in the treatment of these questions, and would rather be guilty of exaggerated skepticism than of yielding credulity.

Of course Sanskrit furnishes the basis—that is, Sanskrit in its oldest form; but Delbrück lays down no general data for excluding accidental coincidences; such methodical considerations he deems unnecessary. Each case has to be taken on its own merits. In concluding his introduction the distinguished scholar speaks of his task almost as if it were a modest one. If he succeeds in laying the foundations for an historical understanding of Greek syntax, he has attained the object of this treatise. He has no desire to touch the great task of building up a history of Greek speech on the foundations thus laid.

These closing words certainly imply a confidence in the new method which goes to the extent of denying either scientific value or practical utility to older processes. Something, however, is to be said in favor of the brood which Delbrück wishes to consign to chaos and old night.

It is true that the method which he characterizes as becoming a thing of the past is no longer fashionable, but for all that it is so familiar to the nature of the human mind that no precautions can keep it out. It is bound to reappear under some disguise, more or less transparent. We all know theoretically that language and logic do not cover each other, and yet we forget ourselves and treat them as coëxtensive. Becker fooled himself by the phrase *organismus*, and when we come to definition we are all prone to set up one general term which shall be wide enough to cover the phenomena. If we do not call the

subjunctive the mood of possibility, we call it the mood of will, which is not much better, on Delbrück's own principles. As to the second method which Delbrück has characterized, I hold it to be all important to get as near as possible to the native conception. Mere difficulty is neither here nor there. Ritschl's motto, *nīl tam difficilest quā quærendo investigari possiet*, is not a proud motto; it is the acknowledgment of a line of duty; and I am not in the least disposed to transfer the work of correlating form and function wholly to the pro-ethnic period.

For the sake of convenience Delbrück has arranged his material according to the parts of speech, as they are commonly called, beginning with the substantive. It is very much to Delbrück's credit that to him at least syntax has not resolved itself into function, and that he has paid especial attention to the order of words in the sentence, as might have been expected from the author of the 'Altindische Wortfolge,' or even from the writer of the well-known treatise on the subjunctive and optative, in which 'posterior' and 'prior' sentences are carefully separated.

The first chapter treats of the *gender* of substantives. In grammatical gender, as distinguished from natural gender, Delbrück shows how great the agreement is between Sanskrit and Greek, and traces back to the pro-ethnic period the association of certain forms with certain genders. The phenomenon of 'heterogeneousness' belongs also to the old stock. So *cakrā* is n. and m. just as the corresponding *κύκλος* has a pl. *κύκλα*. The Greek then has retained the I-G. condition essentially. Luckily we have to consider not the ultimate reason for the gender, only the reason for the deviation of the gender. This is to be sought, according to Brugman, either in the external resemblance of form or in the inner signification. So *pulvis* an original n. follows the analogy of *piscis*, while on the other hand *das fräulein* becomes *die fräulein*. In Greek Delbrück can adduce no example of the former class.¹ Of the latter he brings forward an important series, the masculine substantives of the first declension. The masculine common nouns, with the exception of *ἀγγελίης* (marked as problematical), *νεηνίης* and *ταμίης*, all have their nom. in *-της*. Many of these have a suspicious resemblance to substantives in *-τηρ*, with which some of them run in couples—*αἰσυμνήτης*, *αἰσυμνητήρ*—*ἀσπιστής*, *ἀσπιστήρ*, etc., and the feminine of these masculines is not only *-τις*, but also *-τρια* (*δέκτης*, *δέκτρια*). As suffix *-τα* in kindred languages occurs only in nominal and not in verbal formations, we may exclude all the verbals in *-της* as having originally ended in *-τηρ*. This is also Brugman's notion. Nothing is said of the accent in this connection. The other substantives in *-της* which are formed from nouns were originally fem. as is shown by the old nom. *-τα*, which cannot have lost a *σ*, and it is likely that these were originally collectives or abstracts, for which analogies are cited from Sanskrit and Slav, in the latter with change of gender.² The patronymics in *-δης* (St. *δα*) are disposed of in the same way. There is no

¹ Brugman in a recent review of Delbrück's *Grundlagen* cites *κάρη* 'head' originally neuter in Theognis, Kallimachos and others fem.

² It is interesting to find that Brugman, just cited for the former half of the theory, dissents decidedly from the latter. See his notice of Delbrück in the *Neue Jahrb.* 1880, s. 660, 'ἱππότα, μηρία, εὐρίοπα, are vocatives used as nominatives.' See also K. Lugebil in the same journal, s. 243.

denying the plausibility of this presentation, which has its analogue in various languages. So, to go no further than English, the fem. *-ster* has become masculine, as it were, under our eyes. But the task of hustling the feminines out of the second declension seems to me somewhat tougher. To an ethnic grammarian looking at the feminines in *-os*, the most natural explanation would be that as we have clear ellipses in many of them, so more or less definite ellipses lay at the base of all those that were not forced to be feminine by the necessity of contradistinction, as ἡ ἵππος ('she-horse,' as a German scholar once translated it into English), over against ὁ ἵππος, ἡ ὄνος, 'she-ass,' over against ὁ ὄνος. So even ἡ κῆρυξ, and worse than that ἡ γραμματεῖς, Ar. Thesm. 432. To be sure if we explain ἡ ὁδός as 'the trodden earth' (γῆ)—ὁδός and ὁδός being etymologically the same—we have to encounter a problem equally difficult, that of the adjectives of two terminations. This problem Delbrück solves by considering them as substantives and not as adjectives, so that Ἡώς ῥοδοδάκτυλος is originally not 'Eos the rosy-fingered,' but 'Eos Rosefinger,' like 'Edward Longshanks' and 'Harry Hotspur.' According to Delbrück then all feminines in *-os* were masculine, and the influence of analogy brought about the change. Οἶμος was originally masc., afterwards, especially among the Attics, it became feminine. 'Evidently because of the analogy to ἡ ὁδός.' But according to his own confession we are no longer in a position to know what analogy induced ὁ ὁδός to try the experiment of Teiresias. Much more simple are the Latin examples *haec Eunuchus* sc. *fabula*, *haec centaurus* sc. *navis*. The Bellerophon is to us also a *she*. If this theory is correct, the transfer of gender proceeded from the predicate where the jar was less felt to the attribute, and the analogy must in almost every case have been sharp and powerful.

The second chapter treats of the *numbers*. Of course the three numbers are I-G. Of the singular there is little to be said except that Delbrück cites old Persian analogies for ὁ Λάκων, ὁ Λακεδαιμόνιος, a usage which brought down upon Thukydides the wrath of the pedantic Dionysios of Halikarnassos, who had not the benefit of reading Spiegel on the Persian cuneiform inscriptions.

Interesting is the retention of the dual in Greek. It is found in Skrs. for twin parts of the body, for which, however, the plural cannot stand as in Greek, and also for other things that go in couples. So even in hostile pairs. It is the number of bothness. So too in old Bactrian. The Greek has more freedom. Twin parts of the body are in Homer put more frequently in the plural than in the dual, which is used only when bothness is emphasized. Still some influence must be conceded to the metre. The combination of the dual subst. with the plural verb is not allowed in Skr. as it is in Greek, and when the numeral δύο is used, Delbrück, fortified by Zend analogies, considers the Greek to have retained the original I-G. condition. There we have no true dual, no bothness, only a twoness. The true dual with a plural is a liberty, and the Greek switches

¹ There is a tendency—is it pro-ethnic?—to forget the feminine gender of some of these words, as is evidenced by Wellauer's change of δρόσοις ἀέπτοις, Aesch. Ag. 165, into δρόσοισι λεπτοῖς. To be sure Wellauer had the analogy of other verbals in -τός which are treated as fem., especially before vowels, δακρυτός ἐλπίς, Aesch. Cho. 234, etc., but λεπτός has practically become a simple adjective, and Wellauer should have required some positive warrant for retaining -οῖς, if indeed it was anything more than a slip. As an illustration of the way in which dictionaries are made, I would state that I find δρόσοι λεπτοί in the last edition of Pape (s. v. λεπτός) without anything to indicate even a v. l.

off from the I-G. track. The dual subst. with the singular verb is supposed to be justified by old Bactrian examples. For the Greek agreement of a plural adjective with a dual substantive D. knows no pro-ethnic analogue. Of course it would be sheer trifling to produce Semitic parallels to the behavior of the dual, but I would venture to say that wherever there is a dual there must be some such vacillation, and any conclusion as to originality is extremely risky. Our 'foundations' seem to be elastic, not to say shaky.

In Sks. and Iranian two notions which belong together but are not designated by the same word may be expressed by a dualistic turn, one of the two words or both words being put in the dual. Of the latter there is no trace in Greek, but Wackernagel contends that the former is found, and maintains that *Αἰαντε* in Homer H. 175 means not the two Aiases, but Aias and Teukros. Familiar to every one is the Latin *Castores*, corresponding most probably to a Greek *τῷ Κάστορε*, which Welcker actually gives as occurring in a passage of Euripides for which Delbrück has searched in vain. I may add that I have been equally unfortunate.¹

Before leaving the dual I would remark that after all that has been written about the dual and Herodotos, Kühner in his grammar actually says that Herodotos employs the dual frequently, whereas the non-use of the form by that author is one of the most notorious grammatical facts in his dialect.

Under the head of the plural D. discusses the well-worn question as to the neuter plural and the verb singular, but as his treatment is not novel, it is hardly worth while to analyze it. All are agreed that it is the difference between unity and variety, or as Coleridge has it between 'plurality' and 'multeity,' that determines the varying construction. Some of the neuter plurals which take plural verbs are what may be called dualizing plurals, under which I should be inclined to classify *γούνατα*, *γυῖα*, *μέτωπα*, *ἦνια*, *ἔρετμά*, and I wish that D. had gained his own consent to treat the *pluralia tantum*, many of which seem to belong to the same category, as names of cities, *Ἀθῆναι*, *Θῆβαι*, and the like. Scant analoga from the Rigveda lead Delbrück to the conclusion that the Greek has preserved an original I-G. freedom. It is a familiar fact that as the dual dies out of later Greek, so there is a growing tendency to mechanical concord in the same period, such as we may observe in recent English, and especially in American English, in which couples seldom take the singular, a very common construction in the healthier period and healthier sphere of our language. I sincerely hope that the revisers of the authorized version have not meddled with that syntactical feature of the English Bible.

The third chapter has to do with the *cases*, for the general treatment of which we are referred to Hübschmann's book, which can hardly be considered a finality. D's study of the cases excludes the sporadic case-endings, such as *-θεν*, which belong originally to the pronoun alone: *-φι* as originally nominal is included.

There is no discussion of the *nominative*. The origin of the *vocative* is left out of view as a matter of indifference for the investigation in hand. Here the only important point is that in the pro-ethnic time there was at least a

¹ The legend which D. cannot find is familiar enough. It is mentioned even in elementary books. Preller's references are to Tzetzes Lyc. 88, 511; Clem. Rom. Hom. 5, 13; Iul. Firm. p. 54 Burs.

vocative sing. Benfey's parallel between the copulation of voc. and nom. by τε in Γ 277 Ζεῦ πάτερ . . . Ἡέλιός θ' ὅς κτέ, and a similar union by means of *ca* in Sanskrit does not seem to me to rest on a sufficiently wide basis of induction. Ἡέλιε cannot be got into the combination on account of the verse, and while it is easy enough to abuse the old device of *metri causa*, we cannot at all events deny the influence when there is a balance.

However it may stand with the predicative use of the vocative in Sanskrit, any sound construing of the predicative vocatives in Greek for the good time reduces them to a minimum.

The *accusative* as treated in ordinary grammars presents various uses. So we have an accusative of the outer object, of the inner object, of extent, of aim, of respect, and so forth. Of late, however, it has been shown from various quarters that in contradistinction to the outer object all the other uses can be easily united in one group. And so Hübschmann makes two great divisions, the *necessary accusative*, otherwise called the accusative of the outer object, and the *voluntary (freiwillig)*, which comprehends all the rest. These two groups are united in the fundamental conception that the accusative is the complement of the verbal idea. Nothing narrower will answer to demonstrate the unity of the accusative use, and, painful as it is, we must resort to a general term. This function of the accusative is further illustrated by the position of the case, which in the primitive order of words immediately preceded the verb. So in substance Delbrück. Of course, as we shall see, such a definition and such a grouping can be of little practical avail and we shall have to descend to types of application. The notion that the accusative is the complement of the verb as the genitive is the complement of the noun is a familiar way of putting the matter, and seems simple. In practice, however, it becomes necessary to qualify at every turn. The combination of verbal nouns in Latin, of adjectives in Greek with the accusative presents no difficulty, because there we have the verbal idea, and on the other hand a true genitive with a verb may be made to depend on the nominal idea, and the current definition of the accusative as the case of the direct in contradistinction to the dative as the case of the indirect object is not satisfactory, as we shall see. But the accusative *in vacuo*, so to speak, the accusative without a verb, what does that complement? Are we to be remanded to the abomination of supplying a verb? Is not the accusative itself clothed upon with a form which suggests object? But I had forgotten that language has no life outside of the formulated sentence, and though I fear lest the literal acceptance of that statement may carry us too far, I am fain to be satisfied. It must be granted then that the accusative or the complement of the verb will cover all the uses of the accusative in the Greek sentence, and the I-G. accusative must be hard to satisfy, if such a definition does not answer for the pro-ethnic state also. The Greek use of the accusative is so much wider than ours, and some of the transitions so startling, that I have sometimes in practical instruction run through the heads of the so-called accusative in Hebrew with a Greek class as an excellent gymnastic for the imagination, which plays a more important part in grammar, practical and theoretical, than is commonly supposed. But such a gymnastic is not necessary with this wide definition of the accusative. Still I would venture to remark, at the risk of appearing very old-fashioned, that there is one meaning which the accusative has and one which it

shares with no other case, and this is the meaning which the ethnic syntax of the Greek has put in the foreground. This is what the Greek himself with marvellous instinct seized upon as his *αἰτιατική*, his *casus effectivus*, so falsely, so lumberingly translated by the Roman grammarians *accusativus*. The object affected takes a great variety of constructions in the range of I-G. as every one knows. Noteworthy, for instance, is the tendency in some I-G. languages to shift the construction when persons are meant and the contrast between the accusative and dative is not brought out by the difference of direct and indirect affection. This is entirely too vague, as the same verb often takes acc. and dat. with little, if any, difference of signification. The contrast is between the sentency of the personal dative and the passivity of the accusative of result. 'The dative,' as I have elsewhere expressed it, 'always implies an object effected, which may be contained in the verb or expressed by the complex of verb and object.' I should therefore unhesitatingly put the so-called accusative of the inner object as the original use of the case from which all the others are evolved, and that without a *salto mortale*.

When Byron says 'I want a hero,' 'hero' would be called in grammatical parlance an outer object; but he says in the next breath, 'an uncommon want,' which is an inner object. There is no grammatical difference between the two expressions. The 'uncommon want' is a 'hero-want,' so to speak; and similar shiftings may be found for the seeking—few more apposite, perhaps, than this from Eur. Supplices 1059-61:

ΕΥΑΔ. ἐνταῦθα γὰρ δὴ καλὸν ἱνικὸς ἐρχομαι.

ΙΦ. νικῶσα νικῆν τίνα; μαθεῖν χρῆζω σέθεν.

ΕΥΑΔ. πᾶσα γυναικας ἄς δέδορκεν ἥλιος.

It is well known to those who trouble themselves with the history of grammatical research that this is the use which Bernhardt makes the essence of the accusative (*die reine Wirkung*), and the recognition of its importance is one of the gains of recent syntactical work. Now if we accept the accusative as the case of the complement, it seems better to take the inner object as the fundamental meaning, because that is the universal complement, which cannot be said of the outer object. For the outer object you must have an active transitive verb, whatever that means. But this outer object, or necessary accusative, the needful complement, I suppose we may call it, this object accusative with transitive verbs is put in the lead by nearly all grammarians, and so by Delbrück in common with Hübschmann. And here I cannot keep from repeating the old remark that there is a traditional jargon about transitive verbs which does not advance the understanding of the matter at all. 'Transitive' is a translation from the Greek *μεταβατικός*, and to the Greek there was no metaphysical conception of 'going over to an object.' A transitive verb was simply one that was capable of being turned into the passive, and as the passive in Greek may be used of a verb which takes the dative in the active, we gain very little by that. Our only way of recognizing an active transitive verb is that it takes an accusative of the outer object, and when we are uncertain whether the object is outer or inner we are in a quandary. The upshot of all this science is that Hübschmann, when he treats of the Zend, enumerates alphabetically all the verbs that take the accusative. Of course

that is impracticable in a Greek grammar, and Delbrück leaves the subject with evident impatience, remarking that grammarians generally satisfy themselves with citing those categories in which there is a different usage prevalent in the language of those for whom the grammar is written. And here I would add that at this point as elsewhere English grammars of Greek retain a traditional reference to the Latin idiom, and of late years through thoughtlessness or ignorance German usage is also kept in view. Delbrück contents himself with calling attention to the fact that this comparison of idioms is merely practical and not scientific. Nor does he discuss the instances in which the grammarians are divided as to the interpretation of an accusative as inner or outer, and cites only one instance of the sort to illustrate the difficulty of the subject. In *πόθεν πλεῖθ' ἡγρὰ κέλευθα*; γ 71, *κέλευθα* is classed by Kühner as an accusative of the outer object, to which one Escher who has written on the accusative in Sophokles objects. *πλεῖν*, he says, is not a transitive verb. D. decides against Kühner 'by feeling.' The English language abounds in similar turns, 'sail the seas,' 'walk the streets,' etc., which my 'feeling' would dispose of as accusative of characteristic, the accusative of measure, content, inner object.

Delbrück notes that the Greek does not go so far as Sanskrit, Zend, Slav, or Latin, which combine with more or less freedom verbal substantives with the accusative. Verbal adjectives are freely handled, but there is nothing in Greek parallel to the Latin 'quid tibi hanc curatiost rem?'

D. concludes that the I-G. use was wider than the Greek, but still limited to adjective and substantive with verbal ideas.

There is according to Delbrück no natural order for the 'voluntary accusative,' and he follows Kühner, because it seems 'practical' to do so. It certainly saves trouble. The first in this indifferent series is acc. of the *inner object*, the cognate accusative and its extensions, *ἀρίστην βουλὴν βουλευεῖν*, *κοιμήσατο χάλκεον ὕπνου*, *Ὀλύμπια νικᾷν*. D. agrees with the general statement that the Greek shows a greater preference for this type than the other I-G. tongues, but adds that it is certain that the type itself is not of Greek origin, a certainty which no one would ever have been at the pains to dispute. The so-called terminal accusative is also I-G., though thrust into the background by the clearer prepositional usage. It might have been worth mentioning that the two are not parallel, if we keep up the distinction between inner and outer object, and that the history of the terminal accusative in Greek shows a narrower limitation in the Homeric time than in the later dramatists. The accusative of extent in time and space is also I-G.

The accusative of respect or of the part affected, *ἀλγῶ τὸν πόδα*, *κεφαλὴν τε καὶ ὀμματα κατὰ ἔοικας*, with the extension of this to *βοῶν ἀγαθός* and the like, is next considered. The adjective gets the construction, according to D., in a two-fold way, first owing to the equivalency of the adjective with the verb *εἶναι* to the verb and the transfer of the predicative to the attributive use, and then through the participle, passing from the accusative with *εἶκα* to the acc. with *εἰκώς*, and so to the acc. with *ἴσος*. As the difference between the adjective and the participle consists in predication, I am unable to see that there is an essential difference between the two ways.

This 'Greek accusative,' as it is called in Latin, is also pro-ethnic according to D., and yet he has no proof of it in Sanskrit, nothing decisive in Slav, and

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p. 91, l. 6 from top for $\lambda\upsilon\pi\epsilon\tilde{\iota}$ read $\delta\acute{\alpha}\kappa\nu\epsilon\iota$.

is obliged to take refuge in Zend, where it does not occur with verbs, but with predicate adjectives alone.

I would here allow myself to remark that if this accusative of respect can be regarded as a 'voluntary accusative,' I do not see why we cannot pack the necessary accusative into it. There is no conceptional difference between *λυπεῖ τὸν πόδα* and *ἀλγῶ τὸν πόδα*. 'Intransitive' and 'passive' do not alter the actual relation. So in Hebrew the passive is unhesitatingly construed with an accusative,¹ if, indeed, it is lawful to produce such a parallel. For the national conception of the construction, the passage of Plato which I cite below is not without its interest.²

Delbrück then asks why is this type lost in the I-G. languages that do not possess it? The answer to this is the concurrent use of the instrumental. So even in Greek we find that the instrumental dative varies with the acc., and the same thing happens in the Zend. In Skr. the instrumental has crowded out the true case-use of this accusative, case-use as contradistinguished from adverbial use. "That this use of the accusative maintained itself in Greek was due partly to the circumstance that the acc. in this special 'constellation' is open to no possible misunderstanding." Without 'pro-ethnic' light we should have said that the Greek had a livelier conception of the actual relation and had preferred life to mechanism.

Of the double accusative D. has nothing to say from the pro-ethnic point of view. The combination of the accusative of the thing with the verb so as to form a quasi-compound verb, which takes an ordinary object accusative, is considered by Kühner to be an idiom of the Greek language, and D. has no analogous phenomena to produce from other quarters. That Kühner does not exhaust the range of the double accusative by his statement appears from the example cited by Escher from Soph. Ai. 1108: *κόλας' ἐκείνους τὰ σέμν' ἔπη*, where both accusatives are coördinate.

Under the head of the adverbial accusative D. admits that the boundary line between this use and the true living case-use is not sharply fixed. The mediation of the transition is not new. He begins with the accusative of the content, which he had only mentioned before in passing; the acc. neuter of an adjective instead of a subst. *ἀλλήκτον πολεμίζειν* B 452 follows naturally on *ἄπρηκτον πόλεμον πολεμίζειν* B 121. The plural is also used, but the difference between *ὀξέα κεκληγώς*, 'a succession of shrill cries,' and *ἡδὺ γελᾶν*, 'a sweet laugh' (sweet laughing) becomes effaced: adverbial accusatives are both singular and plural, and the choice is no longer syntactical but æsthetical—a dangerous phrase against which I must protest in passing. How much of our syntax is nothing, if not æsthetical. With the number the case itself also vanishes from the memory, and for the same reason. No definite individual thing is present to the mind. The next step is to combine this accusative with verbs with which it

¹ See Ewald Lehrb. 133 a, cf. also 284 a. The *σχῆμα καθ' ὅλον καὶ μέρος* as in Greek. The passive retains the part. To me the retention of the accusative is as nothing in comparison with the leap which language makes from the acc. to the nom. in the full development of the passive, even after making the most of intransitive and reflexive.

² Plato de Republ. 5, 462 D: *ὅταν πον δάκτυλός του πληγῇ, πᾶσα ἡ κοινωνία ἡ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα πρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν τεταμένη εἰς μίαν σίνταξιν τὴν τοῦ ἀρχοντος ἐν αὐτῇ ἡσθετό τε καὶ πᾶσα αἶμα ζυνήλγησε μέρους πονήσαντος ὅλη καὶ οὕτω δὴ λέγομεν ὅτι ὁ ἄνθρωπος τὸν δάκτυλον ἀλγεί.*

does not stand in an accusative relation, and then with adjectives. But if the accusative is the case of the complement of the verb, it is hard to see why the adverbial accusative should not be as much felt as any other. But it is not needful here to follow Delbrück in copying Kühner. It suffices us to know that here too we are on I-G. soil. As to the form, Delbrück notes the three classes: (a) neuter of adjectives both singular and plural, the dual not occurring, as the relation is indefinite; (b) accusatives of adjectives in the feminine form to which a feminine substantive must be supplied. Here we are told not to mind ellipses, against which the modern philological world is so much prejudiced. Lobeck long ago gave the right point of view for these formations. (c) acc. sing. of subst., such as *χάρις*, the use being originally appositional.

As we approach 'the mixed cases'¹ we are nearing ground which Delbrück has made especially his own, and his remarks deserve attentive consideration. The doctrine that the Greek *genitive* contains both a *genitive* and an *ablative* has become one of the commonplaces of Greek grammar, and there is no denying the gain of thus dissecting the case-form, but the gain is for us who have to learn the language, and is far more practical than scientific. Apart from the number of new difficulties which arise as to the distribution of the uses among these different factors, the strain to represent to oneself the national conception is very much intensified. So long as a language retains a form in full function anywhere, the type is alive everywhere. The justification of an objective case in the English noun is the existence of an objective case in the pronoun; the justification of acc. and nom., of gen. and dat. in the dual number of Greek is to be found in the clear-cut acc. and nom., gen. and dat. elsewhere. Sometimes syntactical habit keeps the memory of the merged form alive. So the English dative is sadly broken down, as is shown by the ready transfer to the subject of the passive. Even the Greek passive cannot show a perfect analogue for 'I am made amends,' 'I was shown a room.' And yet there is a sense of uneasiness, as if the expression were a violation of a principle, and so when the dative signs 'to' or 'for' are commonly used to make the dative relation more plastic, the language is less prone to do this violence to itself. The preposition is indeed the great syntactical gnomon of merged cases. This the Roman teachers themselves perceived, for they too knew and taught that

¹ I frankly confess that I do not like the expression 'mixed case' altogether. A mixed case would, properly speaking, be one in which both form and function are mixed. A case-form with double or treble case functions is a different thing. Of course Boeckh looked upon this subject with other eyes than grammarians of the present day, and yet his remarks in the *Encyclopädie u. Methodologie der Alterthumswissenschaft* are worth considering still: Man hat den Genetiv, Dativ und Ablativ Mischcasen genannt, weil sie ausser ihrer ursprünglichen Function die der verloren gegangenen Instrumentalis und Localis übernommen haben. Indess darf man sich dies nicht so vorstellen, als ob sie bei der Vertretung jener Casus ihre Grundbedeutung eingebüsst hätten. Dies ist ebensowenig der Fall als die Praeposition *de* ihre Grundbedeutung geändert hat, wenn sie im Französischen Verhältnisse bezeichnete, die im Lateinischen theils durch den Genetiv, theils den Ablativ ausgedrückt werden. Die untergegangenen Casus sind vielmehr geschwunden, weil sich die durch dieselben bezeichneten Verhältnisse auch mittelst der Grundanschauungen der andern Casus auffassen lassen, wie die Unterschiede der verschiedenen Sprachen beweisen. Of course this is rank heresy. The gen. case-form in Greek, as we shall see, represents two distinct cases, and yet to the Greek himself as to Boeckh the original gen. must have seemed more expansive than it does to the recent syntactical school. Curtius, by the way, does not go so far as some modern investigators and admits a certain widening of the case.

the ablative was a mixed case, as is shown by a familiar passage in Quintilian (1, 4, 26) penned many centuries before Delbrück's classic treatise on Ablative, Local and Instrumental.¹

Delbrück takes up first that part of the Greek genitive which corresponds to the I-G. genitive, and easily disposes of Kühner's view that the genitive originated from the subject or object of a sentence. Objective and subjective genitive are only in place at any rate when the word which takes the genitive is a verbal substantive, and there I much prefer the old nomenclature 'active' and 'passive.' The view that the genitive proper is a kind of deorganized adjective is one that has always commended itself to me personally, and Delbrück concedes its inner probability. At the same time he remarks that the etymological proof of this is in a bad way, and that the identification of *δήμῳ* with *δημοσι-* is absolutely wrong, as the *σ* in *δημοσι-* arose from *τ*—a useful warning. Delbrück then considers the *gen. with the substantive* as to all intents and purposes an adjective, and cites familiar parallels, *Σθενέλης υἱός*, *coniunx Hectora*, Sanskrit, Slavonic. For the Greek, however, it might be well to notice the differentiation between the compound, the adjective and the genitive, near as they stand to each other. To a Greek of the Platonic time ὁ Κλεινίε παῖ had a very different tone from ὁ παῖ Κλεινίου, perhaps not merely from poetic associations. Of course D. leaves this genitive proper to make its own way in the world with the substantive to which it is married. Possessor and possession, cause and effect, part and whole, these are things which take care of themselves. He considers Kühner wrong in putting the notion of separation under the genitive proper, for this belongs properly to the ablative element. If, as he says, the partitive genitive occurs in Sanskrit as a pure genitive, it would not be hard to conceive the genitive of separation as a pure genitive either; for, taking the preposition as a gnomon, the partitive genitive may be conceived as an ablative in Greek. The fact is that the conception shifts in both categories named, and separation as dispossession may take the genitive proper. Not as much light, according to Delbrück, falls on this Greek genitive from the Sanskrit as were to be desired. The Sanskrit abstract governs a noun more freely, and the Sanskrit is fond of composition where the other languages use genitive terms. For *Σωκράτης ὁ Σωφρονίσκου, ἡ οἰκία τοῦ πατρὸς*, there are analoga in Sanskrit; he speaks doubtfully of the *gen. of material* in old Sanskrit, with certainty of it in Lithuanian; and *δέπας οἶνον* has its analogue as well as the partitive *gen.* Subjective and objective *gen.* also occur, *ποῦ γῆς* is good Zend and *τῆς ἡμέρας* good Sanskrit, good pro-ethnic.

The *genitive with the verb* is evidently a more difficult problem than the genitive with the substantive, and the most simple way of disposing of it would be to make it depend on the nominal idea contained in the verb, a familiar grammatical device in such verbs as *ἄρχω*, *τυραννέω*, and the like. But Delbrück does not give us anything so definite as this. He only tells us that the verb is paralleled with the accusative, and cites a sentence of Jacob Grimm to the effect that the accusative is completely controlled by its verb,

¹ Quærat enim [ille praeceptor acer atque subtilis] sitne apud Graecos vis quaedam sexti casus et apud nos quoque septimi. Nam cum dico *hasta percussi* non utor ablativi natura: nec, si idem Graece dicam, dativi.

while the genitive shows less objectivization, and the force at work (*die thätige Kraft*) is, as it were, only attempted and started, not exhausted. This view, which is no longer novel, is adopted by Delbrück and declared to be perfectly consistent with the assumption that the genitive is an adjective. 'Des Kalbes essen' may have been originally 'Kälbernes essen.' 'Kälbernes' reminds me of the Viennese bills of fare in which these original genitives abound. In other parts of Germany, I believe, the simple substantive is considered sufficient on the principle that a definite portion is put in the accusative in Greek and presumably in I-G. I am personally, as I said, a hearty advocate of the adjective origin of the genitive, but I must confess that this very point has given me more trouble than it should have done with Delbrück's assurance to back me. For 'Kälbernes essen' it is not necessary to eat a whole calf, hence the partitive type of application; and so I have always explained it to myself: and yet when we want to express a characteristic notion we do not use the genitive in Greek, but the accusative. We are not at the bottom of the matter.

But I hasten to the I-G. foundations. Delbrück makes use of the parallelism between acc. and gen. for his terminology and arrangement, and actually calls the gen. here considered the accusative genitive, and follows the same points of view in his development. It will perhaps be remembered that he renounced under the accusative anything like an organic arrangement. Of the genitives which correspond to the outer object he notes that in the Rigveda verbs of imparting take the genitive, then verbs of enjoyment and cloyment, as I should allow myself to call them, verbs of eating and drinking, verbs of actual and intellectual perception, among which the Greek scholar will be delighted to notice *vid*, verbs of remembering and forgetting. Verbs of ruling, which Kühner falsely lists with verbs of superiority, have a primeval genitive. 'We may bring the difference between acc. and gen. before us by translating: Gewalt haben an jemand.' Surely a very slipshod way of stating the matter, but the whole book is a series of jottings. The verbs of the emotions take the gen. partly as an inner, partly as an outer accusative. The heart of these combinations is also pro-ethnic. For the judicial verbs the Greek has the comfort of the Latin. Delbrück knows no Skr. analogies.

With the acc. of the inner object may be compared the gen. with *ὄζω* and the like. Delbrück thinks the difference between acc. and gen. very evident, and so it is at points, but the cases are not all so clear as those which he cites from Pind. Ol. 3, 23: *οὐ καλὰ δένδρε' ἐθαλλεν χῶρος*, and Homer E 72: *λεϊμῶνες μαλακοὶ ἰὸν ἠδὲ σελίνου θήλεον*. Here again no direct parallel can be produced. Still there is a pro-ethnic foundation.

The genitive of aim is parallel with the accusative of aim (the terminal accusative), so with notions of physical and mental feeling, seizing, reaching, desiring, aiming, and the like. This gen. is found in Slav, but the discussion of the Skr. relation is postponed. In the accusative as in the genitive there is nothing but the complement of a verb, which we conceive as the aim. The gen. in *ὠρμήθη δ' Ἀκάμαντος* Σ 488 is not to be explained otherwise than the acc. in *ὠρμωμένῳ νεπτέρας πλάκας* Soph. O. C. 1576. The gen. combines with the verb in the same immediate way as the accusative, but is to be distinguished from the acc. in the way defined by Grimm. For my part I am unable to produce a parallel from my grammatical reading for so unsatisfactory a result, in

which theory and practice tug against each other perpetually. An immediate combination is not consistent with the difference which is set up.

Then follow verbs of approach and meeting, on which Delbrück has nothing more to remark than that the acc. also occurs, and that on the strength of the isolated *ἐμὸν λέχος ἀντιώσαν*. The analogy of the double acc. is brought forward to help the acc. and genitive, as if the acc. and genitive were not much easier to understand. Verbs of filling, verbs of plenty, take the genitive, while verbs of want belong to the ablative side of the house. In Skr. *par* and similar verbs take the gen. or the instrumental, as even in Greek the instr. dative occurs. And then we are taught how the pro-ethnic imagination could pass from the simple combination *ἀφαιρείσθαι τινά τι* to the more difficult *πιμπλάναι τί τινος*, which, as I have said, we perversely consider the more simple. "The reason why the gen. is used in the latter instance is due to the fact that we have in mind only a part of a greater mass."

The gen. of price and value is made to follow the same analogy, such as it is. Latin and Slav. have this gen. The Skr. employs the instr., which the Greeks also use. I cannot go into the faint Skr. parallel for the gen. of the stake. It is enough to know that this type is pro-ethnic.

On surveying the ground traversed, Delbrück remarks that the Latin use is narrower. This is the more distressing as the Latin has kept its genitive pure and unspotted from the world, that is, as far as cases are ever pure and unspotted. The Latin gen. has not allowed itself to be contaminated by the preposition as the Greek gen. has done, and, with the exception of some slight flirtation with the locative, may be considered virginal. Delbrück thinks, however, that the Latin genitive is actually prudish and that the Greek freedom is nearer the pro-ethnic type.

So even the Skr. does not escape an oblique censure. Verbs of touching, seizing, and the like do not take the gen. in Skr., and yet if Grimm's distinction be true, which by the way can hardly be Grimm's especial property, we ought to have the gen. It is more natural that the object case in Skr. should have spread itself over these verbs than that the Greek should have introduced the natural construction *ex propriis*, which I interpret to mean *propriis viribus*. We have then the comfort of knowing that all these Greek constructions are pro-ethnic.

The predicative gen., the gen. with *εἶναι*, and the like is a pro-ethnic of the first water. Here the genitive may easily be conceived as an adjective. The only trouble is that it would be a nominative here as it was an accusative—and such an accusative!—in the preceding combinations. To be sure, the guess might be hazarded that in primeval language the *verbum substantivum* took its predicate in the acc., which would make everything comfortable. I have nothing to urge against this conjecture except that it lacks the merit of novelty, being familiar to every reader of Ewald (Lehrb. § 279 a. Note).

When the genitive is construed with adjectives, the adjective is a substantive or takes the accusative genitive with which we are familiar.

As to the local genitive Delbrück has, with a candor that does him all honor, taken back a notion which he advanced in his 'Ablativus Localis und Instrumentalis,' that certain Greek genitives represented the locative, such as *ἡ οὐκ Ἀργεὺς ἦεν Ἀχαικοῦ*; γ 252. He has reconsidered his position and recognized the

force of the neg.,¹ and the analogy of ποῦ γῆς. ἔξετο τοίχου τοῦ ἑτέρου he is now disposed to classify as an extension of the verbs of striving and aiming. Still he is not satisfied, and while he gives up λελουμένος Ὠκεανοῖο, θέρεσθαι πυρός as locatives, he sees no clue to the puzzle. The current partitive explanation does not convince him, and 'bathed an ocean-bath' and 'warm oneself a fire-warmth' which lie much nearer than some of his own interpretations, would be entirely too simple.

The instrumental θείν πεδίοιο he also abandons, and the instr. gen. generally, only hinting at a parallel between πεδίοιο θείν and πλεῖν θάλασσαν. In the ardor of my first love for the adjective theory of the gen. I saw no more difficulty in πεδίοιο θείν than in θυραῖος οἶχνεῖ, ἐκτόπιος συνθείς, φοιτᾷς ὑπερπόντιος, ὑπαίθριον ταλαιπωρεῖν, to say nothing of the mass of temporal adjectives used in a similar way, a very large number of which by the way end in -ιος, like the Ionic gen.

What is to be done with genitives like αὐτοῦ, ποῦ,² and the like is also a puzzle to Delbrück, as it well might be, a curious illustration of the advance which Greek grammar has made since the time when Krüger fancied this to be a survival of the oldest gen. use, as may still be read in the fifth ed. of his grammar, edited by Pökel, § 47, 1. An analogy with the genitive of time νυκτός is out of the question. This is not a matter of ἄλογος αἰσθησις. Space within which might be a gen.; point at which never. Before Brugman had put the doctrine of so-called compensative lengthening in the right light, it might have been possible to suppose a genetic connection between these forms in -ου and the adverbs in -οῦτι. This I grant is now entirely out of the question, and yet they stand facing each other in a way that reminds one of -της and -τηρ above cited. Of course a school which explains all the perfects in κα by a false analogy with δέδωκα from δωκ will make very light of ὑψοῦ. Elsewhere, it will be observed, the temporal relation grows out of the local; here we are to reverse the process, which must also give us pause. I can understand time as the measure of space as in German; that is common everywhere. But not 'when' for 'where.' νυκτός is parallel with ὁδοῦ but not with ποῦ. In short I do not consider ποῦ and its kindred to be genitives at all any more than I consider domi a genitive. What it came from *viderint phonetici*.

The adjective explanation of the temporal genitive, to which I have already alluded, is simple enough and familiar enough. It is one of the most evident applications of the theory. Indeed the use of the adjective in this way is familiar to all periods of Greek literature. Besides the gen. itself is not so much temporal as characteristic, τῆς νυκτός is contrasted with τῆς ἡμέρας, and the notion of time within which is an extension. This temporal genitive is I-G., is pro-ethnic. It appears in Skr., in Zend.

At the close of his exhibit Delbrück apologizes for making the adjective theory the basis of his arrangement of the pure genitive, and declares again that if we put ourselves strictly on the historical point of view, we have noth-

¹ Which would have been suggested to a Greek scholar by the prevalence of τοῦ λοιποῦ with the neg.

² I see no cogent reason for considering οὐδαμοῦ and μηδαμοῦ in such combinations as Xen. Comm. 1, 2, 52 as a gen. of price, though this is a view advocated by G. Wolff and N. Wecklein on Soph. Antig. 183.

ing to do with the fundamental conception, which does not belong to the syntax of the individual language; we have only to separate the new types of application, if such may be, from the old. May I venture to say that the only thing that helps us at all in our endeavor to grasp these uses, new and old, is this very theory for which he apologizes? If we are to limit ourselves to the types of application and reject all hypotheses of fundamental signification, it is difficult to see how a classical philologist is to be much profited by this study. If we are to despair of getting an insight into the genesis of the form, the mere fact that this or that is 'ethnic' or 'pro-ethnic' is a mere curiosity. If, as Delbrück maintains, there was no consciousness in the language of a nexus in sense between these different uses, nothing but separate and distinct types, the gain of this whole comparison becomes infinitesimally small for the class of scholars to be enlightened. Is the genitive really parallel with such words as the Fr. *son*, which holds in its three letters so large a number of radicals? Is the attitude of our consciousness towards inflexion the same as its attitude towards complexes of sound, which have different meanings in different collocations? If the genitive form does duty at the same time for an ablative, pure and simple, if no mediation is possible between abl. and gen. in signification, then we have a state of things such as Delbrück would not recognize in *ποῦ*—a mere coincidence of forms. This coincidence of form does not suffice to kill the merged case. If there is any the least fibre of organism left in any part, the type is preserved, and this is a point to be kept steadily in view as we follow Delbrück's treatment of the ablative element of the genitive.

The I-G. ablative designated that from which something goes away or starts, the point of separation or origin. In Latin it united with the instr. and locative, in Greek with the gen. The gen. is then an abl. when it occurs with verbs which signify 'to come from,' 'rise from,' as in the *βάρων ἵστασθε* of Soph.—whose case-register, I would remark, is very peculiar—"retire" as in the *χάζοντο κελεύθου* of Homer, 'flee from' *τῆς νόσου πεφευγένοι* of Soph.—verbs of privation and verbs of taking away. It will be remembered that the double acc. with verbs of taking away was adduced to comfort us when considering verbs of plenty in an entirely different category according to Delbrück himself. *κενός* and *γυμνός* form a bridge between the gen. and abl. D. follows Leo Meyer in deriving *δέομαι*, *δέω*, *δεῖ* from a radical akin to Skr. *durd* 'far,' and I would add that a similar origin has been claimed for *δευτερος* (Am. Journal of Philology, vol. i, p. 381). *τί δεῖ*, means then 'what is far,' 'is still wanting,' 'is necessary.' Other abl. constructions are found with other separative verbs which it is not necessary to go through with, and further with verbs of origin. According to Delbrück, in *πατρός ἐσθλοῦ πεφυκέναι*, *πατρός* is an abl. gen., but that is not 'proved' by the 'vicarious preposition.' 'Burn *up*' and 'burn *down*' are not the same thing though they may be used of the same action. Nor are 'bury *in*' and 'bury *with*' the same. 'A noble sire's offspring' and 'sprung from a noble sire' are not the same, and English grammarians will tell us that even the 'head of an ass' and 'an ass's head' are not identical, although English authors are not so discriminating as the grammarians. Here again Delbrück recognizes a bridge and grants the possibility of the pure gen. with participle of passive signification. 'Pouring' and 'drinking' out of a vessel, 'bringing

from,' 'receiving,' take the abl. gen. *δέχεσθαι* is construed either with the ablative of him from whom or the locative of him in whose place the thing is received, of which more hereafter. The gen. with *ἀκούω* is the acc. gen. when only one case is employed, the abl. when acc. of the thing and gen. of the person are combined. In *τό γε μητρὸς ἐπείνθεο, μητρὸς* is an abl. Verbs signifying superiority, inferiority, preference, are also abl. The gen. of material seems to be an original ablative, but the line which separates it from the true genitive is like the shadow of Poe's Raven, and well it might be in view of the fact that the Latin coincides with the Greek in the use of the adjective which is gen., and in the use of *ex* with the abl. which corresponds to *ἐξ* with the abl. gen., the Greek gen. being left between the two.

'The gen. with the comparative is undoubtedly an ablative as is shown by Skr., Zend and Latin.' This view has so much in its favor intrinsically that it has found ready acceptance. It can be illustrated from a great variety of languages. It is shown in the Hebrew *min*, in the *plus de* of mod. French. This is the abl. of *hersicht*, as it has been called, and there is no denying the comfort of the view. Inside the language, however, there is no expression of the relation by aid of an abl. preposition such as we found with the gen. of material. The prepositions which furnish side expressions take the acc. With so marked an abl. as the gen. with the comparative it may seem wild to speak of a bridge to cross the gulf, and D. speaks of none. Yet the possessive gen. does furnish us with a slender thread of connexion. When we say 'my betters' in English, 'my' furnishes the standard, and occasionally in Greek we have positions which indicate the possibility of a similar conception. The vicarious construction with *ἦ* has not been cleared up, and Delbrück is not satisfied with Schömann's view. Finally D. does not know what to do with such gen. as *μέτεισιν οὐ μακροῦ χρόνου* Soph. El. 478; *τὸν ἄνδρ' εἰκεν ὕπνος οὐ μακροῦ χρόνον ἔξειν* Phil. 821; *ἥξοντα βαιῶν καὶ χι μύριον χρόνον* Oed. Col. 397. There is Sanskrit analogy, it seems, for the abl., but I cannot understand how any one can see any fundamental difference between this and the ordinary gen. of time within which, which is paralleled by *ἐν* with the dative.

Adverbs in *-ως* are ablatives, as we have all known these many years, and I would again apologize for bringing up in this Journal so many commonplaces of Greek grammar.

Far more important is the question which D. next discusses, the coalescence of these cases. How did the gen. and abl. get rolled into one? In approaching this problem D. cites familiar examples of the absorption of the signification of one case by another. In Old Persian the dat. has vanished and its functions have been transferred to the gen., a process that Delbrück explains by the behavior of the later Skr. which hands over all manner of functions from the dat. to the gen. By a similar proceeding the dative form became rare, then forgotten. So in certain German dialects the simple preterit has passed out of the memory of those who use the language. A similar impoverishment is found in the Romance languages, and D. well remarks that if a process which has gone on, as it were, under our own eyes is so hard to follow, we must not be surprised to find nothing but gropings in this far darker region.

In I-G. there was a form of the abl. plur. which differed from the gen. and which coincided with the dat. as is the case in Latin. In the sing. the *ā*-stems

(II decl.) had a special form of the abl. in *-āt*. Delbrück thinks that the Zend and Latin ablatives that do not belong to the *ā*-stems are new developments, and that all the other stems have the common ending *-as* for gen. and abl., so that the Sanskrit represents the original state of things. All which D. admits to be problematical. This would furnish us with the external ground, the merging of form.

In Skr. the abl. is alive, kept alive by the large number of abl. forms in the *a*-stems. If the Hindu had not had a clear consciousness of the abl. as a special case, a confusion was to be expected between the two cases in the *ā*-stems as well as in those stems in which the abl. gen. forms are identical. This confusion is very rare in the older language, more common in the later. Apply this to the Greek. The Greek lost its abl. plur. very early, and hence the common ending (*-ος*) of gen. and abl. of the 'non-*a*-stems' could the more easily occasion the coalescence of abl. and gen. in the '*a*-stems.' Because they said *χάζεσθαι νηός* (*ναφός*) so they said *χάζεσθαι κελεύθου* or rather *κελεύθοιο*, the abl. being *κελεύθω(ς)*.

When D. comes to the inner grounds he says that we might conclude that there were certain points of contact between the gen. and abl., from the fact that grammarians who start from the unhistorical conception of a simple Greek gen. manage in a measure to stow away the old abl. in the genitive. Far more important, however, is the fact that points of contact present themselves unsought to those who are not interested in forcing all the uses of the two cases under one fundamental conception. And so after rejecting with scorn the unhistorical view that verbs and adjectives of want are construed with the gen. as the negative of verbs and adjectives of fulness, he admits the force of an explanation which goes very far to restore the unity of the case. If possession and dispossession, union and disunion, are paired under a common head, there is no impassable gulf fixed between gen. and abl. But I will not follow D. through other familiar instances of the thin partition between these two cases, only adding that he considers the increasing importance of the prepositions *ἐξ*, *ἀπό*, etc., to have contributed to the decline of the abl., the form becoming less necessary, and that *-φι* also encroached on the unfortunate case.

If any case is a mixed case it is the Greek *dative*, which, however, in spite of its importance, the length of this review reminds me to despatch as happily as I may. Here we have a compound of the original dative, the locative and the instrumental, as is shown to some extent by the form. The dative of the third declension is a locative—perhaps. In the first and second declensions the dative has the upper hand in most dialects, the locative form being sporadic; in Elean, Arcadian and Cypriote, the dative yields to the locative. The I-G. *ā*-instrumental is probably not extant in the Greek noun, but has left traces in adverbial formations such as *ἄμα*. The I-G. *φι*-instr. is yet to be seen in the Homeric dialect. As to the plural D. is satisfied with guessing that the old locative and instrumental have been fused.

1. As to the *pure dative* D. has given up his notion that the case originally meant 'inclination toward something,' and now agrees with Hübschmann that it is a purely grammatical case, 'grammatical case' being another modern device for beclouding an issue. As such it is the case for which the

predication is meant, 'der casus welchem die Aussage gilt.' Perhaps the case of reference would not be a misrepresentation. From a purely ethnic point of view stress might be laid on the personal character of the dative, and I have elsewhere defined the Latin dative as a case of personal interest, and tried to harmonize the relation of dative to locative by considering it a sentient locative, which does not require actual local contact and provides for Delbrück's forsaken Ariadne, his abandoned 'inclination.' For the use of the pure dative there are Skr. analogies enough, and no one can doubt about its being 'pro-ethnic.' From an ethnic point of view I cannot see how anybody could dream that we have a locative in *θεοῖσι δὲ χεῖρας ἀνέσχον* Γ 318, and it is passing strange to an outsider that D. should consider such a conception possible though he takes care to controvert it. There is not a ray of new light on this subject.

2. Under the head of the *local* dative D. has again to announce a change in his view, one of those numerous changes which make an ethnic grammarian who is desirous of a sure foundation, somewhat shy of building too rapidly on the lines presented in this treatise. Formerly D. separated the dative of the place where from the dative of the place whither, such a dative as we find in *αἱματώσσει δὲ χεῖρ πεδίῳ πέσεν*. This he has taken back, admonished by Holtzmann that the terminal loc., if I may dare thus render 'Loc. des Zieles,' is not the 'Casus des schlechthinnigen Zieles,' an expression which would be utterly spoiled by translation. If I may venture to cut the whole matter short, what they mean amounts to this: Just as 'in loco stare' and 'in loco ponere' present the same relation, so *πεδίῳ πέσεν*, and *Ἑλλάδι ναίων* do not present a different conception to the Greek. For my own part I am not so sure of that. May not *πεδίῳ* after all be the pure dative? Personification is a very easy process to a lively language.

I cannot go into detail as to the assignment of other combinations. To me *δέχεσθαι* takes the pure dative and not the locative.

3. The *instrumental dative* gives D. a new occasion to retract his former error as to the explanation of *πεδίοιο θένειν*, in which he once recognized the prosecutive instrumental.

The case *in -φι* is briefly discussed. The suffix is generally used as an instr. loc. and abl., occasionally, as D. thinks, in passages where only gen. or dat. would seem possible. This divagation is attributed to the disappearance of the original force from the consciousness.

It is possible that I may take up at a later time Delbrück's treatment of the verb, and discuss it in a more serious and systematic way. I would only say in closing my *résumé*, that if I have allowed myself some freedom of expression, I have not intended to write anything incompatible with the highest esteem of Delbrück's own work. In the present essay he has put together for the behoof of the *seri studiorum*, a number of facts and hypotheses, which are doubtless suggestive and instructive, but the book is not equal to the title by which it will always be quoted. If he had only called it 'Erörterungen'—perhaps one good would have resulted—this review would not have been written.

B. L. G.